Towards the end of the philosophical treatise Pantheisticon, published from the imaginary state of Cosmopolis in 1720, the author John Toland acknowledged a debt owed by the Pantheists to Cicero for "so many and such distinguished things."
Early enlightenment readings of Cicero's academic scepticism
There was a point of debate in English Enlightenment discourse, long neglected, which needs to be elucidated in order to understand how Toland constructed his Ciceronian Scripture: what was Ciceronian scepticism? 19 The question of what it means to classify Cicero as sceptical is deceptively complex. Cicero numerous times identified himself with the philosophical school of the Academic Sceptics, and while there is some debate as to the consistency with which he maintained that stance, there is little question that at the time of his main philosophical compositions towards the end of his life he was an Academic Sceptic. 20 Within the Academic school there existed deviations concerning the function and character of scepticism in their philosophy: the radical scepticism of Arcesilaus denied the possibility of philosophical knowledge; the mitigated scepticism of Philo of Larissa and Carneades concurred that no philosophical knowledge could be certain, but the closest approximation to truth could be accepted as probabile; and Antiochus's Old Academy abandoned overt scepticism entirely. 21 Between the variations apparent within the Academic school, and Cicero's composition of many of his philosophical works as dialogues in which the authorial voice was obscured, a clear understanding of Cicero's personal scepticism becomes all but impossible. This did not prevent a dispute arising in the early Enlightenment centred on the question of how Ciceronian scepticism should be characterised. Crucial to this debate were Cicero's theological dialogues, De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione; while not explicit discourses on the question of scepticism, the issue of how Ciceronian scepticism should be understood is central to how they are read, and how a Ciceronian theological position might be extracted from them.
A mitigated scepticism
In the early Enlightenment there was an influential drive towards an understanding of Ciceronian scepticism which can be identified with the mitigated scepticism of the Philonian tradition. 22 While the denial of "truth" by Cicero was accepted, there was an emphasis on the principle of the probabile in how certain writers interacted with Ciceronian scepticism. They recognised the process by which Cicero was able to conclude which argument or philosophical principle was closest to the truth, or most probable, and determined that this conclusion could then be adopted as the "Ciceronian" view. This is perhaps best demonstrated in the work by eminent Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, entitled The True Intellectual System of the Universe, and published in 1678. See this exposition of Cicero's Academic philosophy:
However, in his philosophick writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words; Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosus id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam Authoritatis in disputando quam Rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, Auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident: They, who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value. Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse De natura deorum (as St. Austin also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point, (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoick) yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureanism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta. 23 Cudworth's understanding of De Natura Deorum characterises it as an example of Ciceronian scepticism in action: having weighed up the merits of the theologies of the differing schools, Cicero determines at the conclusion of the dialogue that the Stoic view is the most probable.
This reading of De Natura Deorum as an example of Cicero's mitigated scepticism was further perpetuated in scholarship on that work. In 1718 John Davies, President of Queen's College, Cambridge, produced an edition of De Natura Deorum as part of his series of editions of Cicero's philosophical works. Davies added the following note to the conclusion of the dialogue, at the point at which Cicero expresses his support for the Stoic case:
at De Divinatione I.9 his brother Quintus says: for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer the truth. Augustine also considers this in the Civitate Dei book V, chapter 3. 24 The method of mitigated scepticism is strongly implied by Davies's citation here, both by the conclusion reached by Quintus that De Natura Deorum reveals Cicero employing that approach to decide in favour of the Stoics, and by the language used, with the phrase ad veritatem … propensior so evocative of the mitigated approach to scepticism. This reading is also apparent in the first English translation of De Natura Deorum, which was produced in 1683. The conclusion of the third book of De Natura Deorum is again identified as an expression of Cicero's acceptance of the Stoic god as the most probable: This interpretation of Ciceronian scepticism acquired significance due to its endorsement of an understanding of Ciceronian theology which cohered with the essential principles of orthodoxy. Ralph Cudworth, for example, felt able to conclude that: beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom tho' some would suspect to have been a Sceptick as to theism, because in his de natura deorum he brings in Cotta the Academick, as well as opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoick, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatick and hearty Theist. 28 Cicero's assessment of the Stoic theology articulated by Balbus in De Natura Deorum as the most probable allowed the principles of that theology to be wielded in discourse as Ciceronian, including the concept of a providential divine force, which was not subservient to necessity, nature, or fate. 29 The question of how to read Ciceronian scepticism became inextricably entwined in early Enlightenment discourse with how Ciceronian theology might legitimately be characterised and hence utilised, as is confirmed by the response among the heterodox to this approach to Ciceronian scepticism.
A critical scepticism
There was a reading of Ciceronian scepticism which was more overt, and focussed on the refutation of dogma in place of the selective assent to dogma characterised above. The most vocal exponent of this understanding of Ciceronian scepticism was Antony Collins, in the above mentioned Discourse of Free-thinking in 1713. In this work, Collins was keen to recruit Cicero into a canon of Freethinkers, and in pursuit of that goal provided the following explanation of Cicero's philosophy:
Cicero's Philosophical Works are mostly written in Dialogue, in which Philosophers of different Sects are introduc'd arguing for their Several Opinions [ … ] . Now the modern Priests, whenever they meet with any Passage favourable to Superstition, which CICERO puts in the mouth of the Stoick, or any false Argument which he makes the Epicurean use, and which they have thought fit to sanctify (such for instance as the Epicurean Arguments from innate Ideas, and from the universal Consent of Mankind for the Existence of Gods in EPICURUS' sense; that is, for Gods in human Shape, who took no care of the World or of human Affairs) they urge it as CICERO'S own, and would have the Reader believe CICERO look'd on it as conclusive. Whereas CICERO himself is so far from approving what he makes the Stoick and Epicurean speak, that he does in his Discourse of the Nature of the Gods endeavor to confute all their Arguments under the Person of an Academick (of which Sect he every where professes himself) and in his Discourse of Divination baffles all the Stoical Arguments for Superstition, openly under his own name. So that CICERO is as unfairly dealt with, whenever he is cited against Free-Thinking, as the Priests themselves would be, did any one cite as their Sentiments what they make Deists, Scepticks, and Socinians say, in the Dialogues they compose against those Sects.
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Cicero must be identified with the character of the Academic Sceptic, according to Collins, the character who refuted the dogmatic assertions of the other schools, so Cotta with his critique of Stoic and Epicurean theology in De Natura Deorum, and Marcus Cicero with his rejection of Stoic arguments for divination in De Divinatione.
This was a reading of Ciceronian scepticism which Toland himself openly championed; in 1712, in a work of classical scholarship entitled Cicero Illustratus, Toland had expressed his case for the appropriate reading of Ciceronian scepticism. Cicero Illustratus outlined Toland's proposal for a new edition of Cicero's complete works; in the chapter articulating Toland's plans for the synopses commonly employed as prefaces to Cicero's works in order to guide the reader, Toland addressed the controversy surrounding how Ciceronian scepticism should be read in De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione. Toland declared of De Natura Deorum that "surely he himself is Cotta, in other words the Academic, in the books of De Natura Deorum?" 31 He supported this assertion with reference to De Divinatione, in which "I would like him to notice that Cicero openly removes the mask from himself in the books of De Divinatione." 32 Toland exposes himself in this work as a firm believer in the representation of Cicero's own scepticism in the characters who profess the stance of the Academic Sceptic.
This reading of Ciceronian scepticism created a very different result from the cautious adoption of Stoic theology identified above. In its place there was the overt rejection of religious dogma, most notably the existence of divine providence governing all things, including nature. See Anthony Collins's summation of his reading:
Two Treatises, one of the Nature of the Gods, and the other concerning Divination: in the former of which, he has endeavour'd to show the Weakness of all the Arguments of the Stoicks (who were the great Theists of Antiquity) for the Being of the Gods; and in the latter has destroy'd the whole Reveal'd Religion of the Greeks and Romans, and show'd the Imposture of all their Miracles, and Weakness of the Reasons on which it pretended to be founded. 33 This alternative approach to Ciceronian scepticism was employed to legitimise a very different understanding of Cicero's theology, arguing that his true understanding of nature, the universe, and the divine could be located in the arguments put forth by Cotta and De Divinatione's Cicero. It is this strategy which Toland employed when constructing Cicero the Pantheist.
A sceptical view of the universe Pantheisticon's "Formula" was designed to remind the Pantheists of both their philosophy, and the consequences of that philosophy for how them and how they lived their lives. The Ciceronian Scripture served both of these purposes, reiterating the philosophical canon underwriting the Pantheistic universe, and providing the explanations for why this view of God should liberate the Pantheists from attempts to infringe upon their reason and freedom. In examining how Toland selected which Ciceronian passages to employ to this end, and the message he intended to communicate with them, the importance of Toland's understanding of Ciceronian scepticism becomes clear.
The pantheistic universe
One consistent principle which results from the approach to Cicero's texts enabled by Toland's reading of Ciceronian scepticism is the basic rejection of the idea that the divine could act outside or beyond the laws of nature: in De Natura Deorum Cotta disputed the idea of a divine providence over-riding nature; in De Divinatione Marcus repeatedly challenged the notion that the divine acted outside the realm of reason and natural law. When in Cicero's Academica, another dialogue, the character of Varro recounted the Academic view of the universe, a view which once more seemed to affirm the divine's inability to act beyond nature, its coherence with the stances of Cotta and Marcus allowed Toland to deploy it as a further expression of Cicero's theology. 34 It was quoted in full in the second section of the "Formula," recited by the Modiperator in the manner of a Lesson, and introduced as the canon philosophicus of the Pantheists. 35 The passage is used to summarise the materialist view of the universe, and how that view establishes the unity of the divine element with the universe, in turn providing a conception of God acceptable to the Pantheist.
The fundamental starting point for the natural philosophy described in the Academica is the understanding that nature is based on two first principles: "their treatment of NATURE [ … ] led them to divide it into two things, with one active and the other lending itself to it and thus acted on in some manner."
36 While the precise terminology employed for these principles varied, the active principle can be termed Vis, or Force, and the passive principle can be termed Materia, or Matter. It is determined that Force and Matter cannot exist one without the other, each requiring the other for their existence; from this combination of Force and Matter, Bodies, or Qualities are formed. Toland's marginal note to this initial gambit in the natural philosophy presented here makes one vital point clear: "Force is indeed Motion: for as there is no Force without Motion, thus the whole Force of Matter Acts by Motion." 37 In this brief note, the coherence is immediately forged between the natural philosophy described by Cicero, and that Toland is seeking to propagate, by identifying Cicero's Vis with the concept of Motus. Moreover, the understanding of the need for Matter and Force to exist together echoes neatly the concept of Matter imbued with Motion, or self-moving Matter, which Toland had been championing since the Letters to Serena.
38 This strategy of making Matter self-moving had been a significant step in the elimination of God as a separate power in the universe; he was no longer needed to orchestrate the Motion which formed entities from Matter.
From this shared understanding of the basic constitution of the universe an understanding of the nature of that universe could arise. The Academica depicts Matter as sufficient to become the basis for everything in the universe; infinitely malleable and divisible, it is from Matter that all things are made. 39 This permits the creation of a universe which is an infinite whole: "they think that matter as a whole is completely changed, producing what they call "qualified things." From these a single world has been brought about in the totality of material nature when it coheres and is continuous in all its parts. No portion of matter, and no body, is outside this world." 40 In the margin, Toland expresses his reading of the passage: the parts of the universe are either integrant or constituent, with no void in between, from whose motion and dispositions arises a truly divine harmony; which cannot be dissolved by any stronger cause, since none exists outside of the infinite whole. 41 The Ciceronian passage therefore becomes an expression of principles vital to Pantheism: the universe was an infinite whole, in which no void existed, and outside of which nothing else could exist. It is on this premise that the fundamental concept of Pantheism was based: "all things are from the whole, and the whole is from all things." 42 It is here that we begin to approach the crucial point: if the universe, formed solely from Matter and Motion, was an infinite whole outside which nothing existed, what role did God have in this universe? This is where the Ciceronian passage reveals its particular worth to Toland and his Pantheistic philosophy. In the Academica, the active principle, or Force, which acted on all Matter, was an intelligent nature which governed the whole universe, and it was this immanent power which could be identified with God: no portion of matter, and no body, is outside this world: everything in it is a part of the world, and all its parts are held together by a sentient nature possessed of perfect reason (which is eternal since there is nothing stronger to make it perish). This force is the mind of the world, they claim; it is also an intelligence, the perfect wisdom they call 'god'. 43 This description of a sentient force administering the universe bears a striking resemblance to Toland's concept of Universal Action. In the Letters to Serena, and earlier in the Pantheisticon, Toland elaborated on his differentiation between Universal Action and Motion: Motions were the simple, local movements of Matter, whereas Action was the Motion of the whole. 44 This Action was rational, immanent in Matter, and ensured the perfect order of the universe; it, like Cicero's rational providence, was God. The consequence of this natural philosophy was a God who could not act outside the realm of nature and reason. Toland's final note to Cicero's Academica expresses this:
the Force and Energy of the Whole is sometimes marked by the name Providence, which orders the celestial and terrestrial in such a way, that all things are arranged with the greatest reason; and there is not any place left for chance or fortune, but all and every thing acts by free will, nothing by compulsion. 45 The liberty of the pantheists Also consistent in Toland's reading of Ciceronian scepticism is the application of reason and nature to test the validity of religious claims: Marcus in De Divinatione uses rational arguments to disprove the examples of divination provided by Quintus, while Cotta in De Natura Deorum directs natural law against both Epicurean and Stoic theology. Toland allows this elevation of ratio to direct his characterisation of Cicero, particularly in the third part of the "Formula," in which Toland's liturgy impresses upon his Fellows that by adopting the philosophy outlined above, they will be liberated from the yoke of irrational fears, the very fears which feed the power of the clergy. This manoeuvre immediately locates Toland's Pantheism in the sphere of his war on priestcraft, the enduring obsession of his life. 46 Throughout his works, whether they be philosophical, political, or scholarly, Toland had challenged the influence wielded by the clergy over the laity, arguing that it was based in the exploitation of irrationality and ignorance. In Pantheisticon, this anticlerical campaign continues as the consequences of the Pantheists' natural philosophy for its followers are expounded: they are able to develop reason, and by adhering to that reason, they live freely. In forming this vision Toland's Ciceronian Scripture once more proves its value.
First, the law according to which the Pantheists must pledge to live, the law of reason, is expressed using the words of Cicero. This rational law, presented again in the manner of a Lesson, is taken from Cicero's De Republica; while in the original this was delivered as part of the debate between Philus and Laelius on the place of justice in the ideal state, for Toland it was available as a fragment by Lactantius, and described as the law of God. The Ciceronian definition of right reason determined that coherence with rational law meant obedience to the laws of nature, and universal accessibility: "TRUE LAW IS RIGHT REASON, consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and eternal." 47 Living according to this law, argues Toland, allows Pantheists liberty, as they are no longer compelled to live according to laws invented by men for the sole purpose of enhancing their own power. Inevitably, the men most guilty of inventing such laws prove to be the clergy. In the prefatory Diatribe, Toland had described the kind of irrational dictates that contravene the law of reason according to which the Pantheists live:
at certain times they comment on that most true and never deceiving thing the LAW OF NATURE, undoubtedly REASON (as shown in the final part of the FORMULA), with the light of whose rays they dispel every shadow, they take away inane worries, they reject most ably counterfeit Revelations (for who sane could doubt the truth?); and as they explode cobbled together Miracles, incongruous Mysteries, ambiguous Oracles: and they expose all pains, tricks, fallacies, frauds, finally womanish fables; by these a cloud obscures RELIGION, and the darkest night obscures TRUTH. 48 The liberty promised by Pantheism is revealed as primarily liberty from the false authority of the clergy of the established Church.
The sceptical Cicero of De Divinatione is then brought in to demonstrate how this re-elevation of reason functioned in the civic sphere. This passage, and Toland's reading of it, emphasised by words set in different sizes, both capitals and small capitals, summarises the relationship between Pantheism and the clergy. 49 Cicero here articulates an explicit rationalisation of religion: the true religion accords with the law of nature; this true religion must be defended against the incursions of superstition; superstitions are those beliefs which transgress reason, as shown here and throughout the second book. Pantheists, by living according to the law of reason, are not rejecting religion, simply the corruption of that true religion by superstition, in this case clerical authority. This is confirmed by the reply the congregation must make following the recitation of this passage: "RESP. The SUPERSTITIOUS MAN is tranquil neither awake nor asleep; he neither lives happily, nor dies fearlessly: alive and dead, he is made the prey of PRIESTS." 50 A life lived according to reason will eradicate superstition, and liberate men from the yoke of priestcraft.
Toland was able to locate much material in the Ciceronian corpus from which to construct his Pantheistic Scripture, but this material emanated from a variety of texts, expressed by different characters drawn by Cicero for his dialogues rather than from Cicero himself. For Toland's Ciceronian Scripture to be convincing, he needed these disparate extracts to reflect a coherent ideology traceable to Cicero. Ciceronian scepticism provided the thread with which Toland could bind his Pantheistic Cicero: the identification of Cicero's "voice" with that of the Academic Sceptic in his dialogues, with the championing natural law and reason, allowed Toland to bring Marcus, Cotta, Varro, Philus, and more together as Cicero the Pantheist.
Ciceronian scepticism: a twofold philosophy?
In the "Dissertation" which concludes Pantheisticon, appended to the "Formula," one final facet of Toland's Ciceronian scepticism is deployed in the service of Pantheism. Here Toland identifies a criticism which might be made of the Pantheists, stating that perhaps it may be turned into a fault of the PANTHEISTS, that they have a twofold doctrine, one External or popular, accommodated to the prejudices of the crowd, or the dogmas publicly endorsed as true; the other Internal or Philosophical, inwardly conformed to the nature of things, and so to Truth itself. 51 This is a supposed dichotomy encapsulated in Toland himself: while he articulated a view of the world which seemingly veered close to atheism, and explicitly attacked the authority of the established Church, he also made public statements of support for that Church, celebrating the efforts of William III and George I to defend the Protestant faith. 52 The assumption that Toland's public and private statements are irreconcilable has affected scholarship on Pantheisticon and the question of Toland's private beliefs, with his public statements being dismissed as the means of masking either his atheism or his radical and subversive views of religion and politics. 53 Yet Toland himself in Pantheisticon explains that these stances are by no means irreconcilable, but in fact two manifestations of the same belief, a strategy which can be traced directly to Cicero. In 1720, in an essay entitled Clidophorus, Toland provided a history of this exoteric and esoteric approach to philosophy, in which the ancient school of the Academic Sceptics was identified as a particularly prominent practitioner of this approach:
What CICERO has somwhere written about others, does not less appositly agree to the Academics. There are two sorts of books, says he; the one popularly written, which they call'd Exoteric; the other more perfectly written, namely the Esoteric, which they left in their Commentaries, or finish'd Pieces. Hence he rightly concludes, that the same Philosophers do not always seem to say the same thing, tho they continu'd of the same opinion; which is as true as Truth it self, of many writers in our own time. 54 Toland therefore understood Cicero's Academic Scepticism to be practically minded, able to express the same idea in two ways, one for a private audience, one for a public audience. This is confirmed by his identification of Cicero's true stance with the character bearing his name in De Divinatione. Throughout the second book of this dialogue a contradiction is apparent between Cicero's decimation of the divinatory practices central to traditional Roman religion, and his own position as an Augur, and hence a priest of that religion and practitioner of divination. 55 Cicero reconciles these positions by acknowledging that while he may privately doubt the validity of divination, this did not preclude the acceptance of traditional religious practices in the public sphere due to the importance of a state religion to the stability of the Republic. 56 This idea that a philosophy could function both privately and publicly, without contradiction, simply adapted for different audiences and functions, was the same notion of a twofold philosophy employed by Toland in Pantheisticon.
Toland introduces this discussion of the twofold nature of the Pantheistic philosophy to encourage Pantheists to assume a public role; while in their private meetings the Pantheists might profess a radical philosophy, this did not necessitate a destructive attitude towards the state, nor preclude the ability to function within the existing structures of society. In fact, Pantheists were well-situated to be good citizens, as "carried away by neither hatred for those nor love for these, they pursue neither factions nor disputes, but the safety of the Republic and the common good of mankind." 57 Toland illuminates this with a passage from Cicero's De Legibus, in which Cicero explains how one might become a vir optimus, a citizen who can employ their reason and wisdom to serve their community. 58 Toland entreats the Pantheist, "Let Learned Men read, and form themselves according to this rule." 59 As Cicero assures his reader that to live according to the law will facilitate the achievement of virtue as described in this passage, Toland assures his reader that the same will result from following Pantheism:
What remains, should the SOCRATIC FELLOWSHIP apply itself to this entirely, so that, with the praise and reproach of others less esteemed, they may live content with their lot, according to their own will not that of another; so that they may furnish the mind with virtue, the character with learning: by which means they may more easily and better serve themselves, their friends, their fatherland, everyone. 60 Permitted by the twofold nature of their philosophy, as was Cicero himself, the Pantheists are able to become viri optimi, according to the guidance provided by Cicero.
First, a man must become aware of his capacity for reason. 61 Annotated by Toland with Sui recognitio, Animi facultates, Ideae et notiones and Ethica, the text affirms that "when he has studied and made a complete examination of himself, he will understand how he came into life fitted out by nature, and what tools he has for getting and possessing WISDOM." 62 This established, Cicero then addresses the need for the wise man to be well-versed in natural philosophy, a need summarised in Toland's notes with Religio and Physica. The understanding described here by Cicero, when supplemented by Toland's annotations, seems to reflect the natural philosophy so far championed, as the wise man has taken up the worship of the gods and pure religion, and has sharpened the gaze of his mind, like that of the eyes, for the selection of good things and the rejection of the opposite, the virtue which is called prudence from the capacity to see ahead, -what can be said or thought to be more blessed than he? 63 The final stage in this process is the realisation of man that he is a member of a civic community:
And when he realizes that he is born for civil society, he will realize that he must use not just that refined type of argument [Politics and eloquence] but also a more expansive style of speaking, through which to guide peoples, to establish laws, to chastise the wicked and protect the good, to praise famous men [Administration of the Republic] and to issue instructions for safety and glory suited to persuading his fellow citizens, to exhort people to honor, to call them back from crime, to be able to comfort the afflicted, to enshrine in eternal memorials the deeds and opinions of brave and wise men together with the disgrace of the wicked [History] . 64 The vir optimus achieves completion when he not only realises he is in possession of ratio, but uses that ratio to aid and guide the community in which he exists. This then is how Pantheists can function in the public sphere; as champions of reason, the law according to which they live, they can attempt to serve the community by exercising that reason.
The question of why Toland should seek to construct Cicero into a Pantheist is therefore answered: where else might he find such an ideal model for his Pantheists? A religious sceptic, doubtful of traditional religion due to a refusal to accept that the divine could contravene natural law or reason, yet enabled by a twofold philosophy to be a virtuous citizen in spite of, or even because of, his private beliefs. This is precisely what Toland is attempting to encourage as the appropriate conduct for a Pantheist.
Conclusion
In Pantheisticon the Ciceronian text provided the words through which the natural philosophy of the Pantheists was expressed, the elevation of reason as their ultimate law was justified, the nature of their Society was defined, and the role of the Pantheist in the community beyond that Society was explained. Further, Toland deliberately elevated the authority of those Ciceronian words by presenting them as akin to a Scripture for the Pantheists. Imbued with such importance, Toland needed to ensure his characterisation of Cicero in Pantheisticon was convincing, a task made possible by his reading of Ciceronian scepticism. Identifying this scepticism with the stances of the Academic characters in Cicero's dialogues, Toland claimed as "Ciceronian" the arguments made for the rational governance of the universe and the consequent rationalisation of society and belief, irrespective of the character who voiced that argument or the context in which it appeared. By these means Cicero the Pantheist was created. Toland was motivated not solely by the Pantheistic material available in Cicero's works, but by the precedent Cicero himself set, as a man whose twofold philosophy permitted him to doubt in private, and remain a virtuous citizen in public. Toland makes clear his desire for the Pantheists to adopt this practice themselves.
It was indicated at the beginning of this article that the role assumed by Cicero in Pantheisticon would be instructive, and so it has proved. Ciceronian scepticism, an intellectual tradition long omitted from the history of early modern ideas, is revealed as not only a point of fraught dispute within Enlightenment discourse, but also an active and formative influence on the creation of Toland's Pantheisticon. Toland's interaction with the Ciceronian tradition confirms that attempting to interpret Pantheisticon solely within the confines of the so-called Radical Enlightenment inhibits a complete understanding of the work. The rehabilitation of the Ciceronian contribution enforces efforts to situate Pantheisticon within the public, political context, as it demonstrates the lengths Toland's conviction that the private philosophy of the Pantheists must and could be reconciled with public life. Moreover, it confirms movements in recent scholarship to demonstrate the depth, breadth, and continuity of intellectual influences acting on the early Enlightenment, challenging the linear view associated with the Radical Enlightenment narrative.
Notes

